A philosophical dive into the skeptical issue of the existence of other minds
Overview
As an undergraduate studying philosophy, I have come to question a lot of beliefs that I had, till now, taken for granted and understood to be true without doubt. The existence of minds is one of those beliefs; it crumbles in the face of ‘why’ when I try to theorize its justification. This blog is an attempt to provide an overview of this problem and what the major responses to it are, along with their critique.
Introduction to The Problem
What reason do you have to believe that the other humans you see are minded creatures like you? All you see are their physical bodies and their outward behavior (which is believed to be a manifestation of their mind, but again, is not directly observed). All I can directly be aware of is my own mind; this much seems infallible (thanks to Descartes’ Cogito). How can we know that there is a mind that dictates how another person behaves? How can we know about the existence of other minds at all? This problem has been portrayed through films like Invasion of Body Snatchers. It is made all the more relevant in the current era of A.I technology.
As per the skeptics, we can not know whether other minds exist, and even if they do exist, we can never know if they are like ours. These are the two versions of the problem of other minds. Note that an answer to the first version of the problem does not resolve the second one.
Other people might experience the world differently: Consider the experience of color for different individuals. There might be a person who sees pink as purple and purple as pink. They might spend their whole life not realizing this. Similarly, we cannot know for sure if different people are experiencing the world in the same way, even if their descriptions of experiences match.
Why Does The Problem Arise?
The problem of other minds arises because we cannot directly perceive other’s minds, or be aware of their consciousness, in the same infallible way we are aware of our own mind and consciousness. Additionally, there are several challenges we encounter when attempting to gain the knowledge of the nature of other minds as being similar or distinct from our own.
Responses
The Argument from Analogy
This inductive defense is considered to be the most popular response to the problem of other minds. The version of this argument, as given by John Stuart Mill, will be discussed here.
I know that I have a mind. I can know that others have a mind, too, by observing the similarities between their behavior and my own.
This argument relies on two points. The first is that we know (without doubt) about the existence and nature of our own mind. Our access to our own mind is privileged, immediate and non-inferential. It is as secure as any knowledge can be. The second is that equipped with the knowledge of our mind and our behavior, we can form an idea about the behavior that a minded creature is supposed to have.
This can be understood with the help of an example. Suppose I accidently cut myself. My response is wincing (as an expression of my pain). Similarly, I can notice the correlation between external stimuli (getting cut, burnt, tickled etc.) and its associated mental state (pain, pleasure etc). In addition, I can observe the same, or similar outward responses in other people when they are faced with the same external stimuli. This should be sufficient reason for me to believe that these other people have minds like I do (as per the proponents of the analogical argument).
Following is the form of the inductive analogical argument being discussed:
P1) I have certain behavioral patterns in response to external stimuli that indicate the presence and nature of my mental state.
P2) For the same external stimuli, the same behavior can be observed in others.
C) Therefore, others experience the same mental states as I do and thus are similarly minded creatures.
Problems of The Argument From Analogy
Even though the argument from analogy seems like a good response to the problem of other minds, it has major flaws. It comes with the limitations of inductive reasoning. Consider the following argument:
P1) I have a birthmark on my right shoulder.
C) All other people have a birthmark on their right shoulders, too.
It is very apparent that this is an extremely weak argument and the premise does not provide sufficient reasons to support the conclusion. How can one think their own case to be the universal case?
The strength of an inductive argument relies on the sample size in its premise. In the case of the analogical argument, there is a mere single person constituting the sample on the basis of which a universal claim is being made. Had it been a representative premise with a substantial sample size, there would have been more weight to the argument. But in order to have that, one would need to assume the similarity and existence of other minds, and hence commit the petitio principii (begging the question) fallacy.
A.J Ayer defended the analogical argument by claiming that such an inference is dependent on a number of correlations between mental states and behavior, even though they might all be restricted to a single person.
Inference from best explanation
As per this response, the uniformity attributed to the law of nature is used to prove the existence of other minds. John Stuart Mill gives the following reasoning: Our belief about other people’s mental state is justified in the same manner as the justification in belief in the scientific unobservable — by the virtue of such a justification being the best available explanation for the available evidence.
Perceptual Knowledge of Other’s Mind
The claim that the knowledge of other minds is perceptual knowledge has been supported throughout the 20th century by popular philosophers of the phenomenological tradition like Husserl, Scheler and Ponty.
If I see someone scream or wince after falling on the ground, then would I not directly perceive that that person is in pain? Would I still need inference to come to this conclusion? And if I am directly able to perceive this other person’s mental state, can I not also ascribe them a mind which allows them to experience the perceived mental state?
This argument is not without flaws. What if appearances are deceptive? Take the case of someone who is acting or lying. Additionally, in the age of A.I and robots, how can we know that the outward perception equates to the existence of a mind? What if the creature we take to be a minded human is actually a philosophical zombie who lacks consciousness yet behaves in the same ways as one would assume a minded creature would?
The Problem of Error
What if the person in front of you is merely pretending to have a mental state? After all, people lie/act all the time. Any conclusion of an argument with a premise containing such a case of pretense fails to be classified as true or as knowledge. The problem here is that cases of pretense and genuine cases might be phenomenologically indistinguishable. Hence, as all cases of perception or testimony of other’s mental state fall prey to this problem, infallible knowledge of other minds cannot be gained.
Thoughts and Conclusion
I think it is safe to say that most of us believe that other people do have minds. The problem of other minds merely points to the problem of coming up with a rationale for such a belief. So far, none of the responses to the problem have been ironclad and without critique/flaws.
While the argument from analogy seems intuitively right, the unitary sample size makes its logical value weak. Similarly, the argument of perceptual knowledge seems susceptible to dubious and false premises, and thus to the argument from error.
I like the inference to the best explanation as a response to the problem. It seems awfully likely that other people, who have similar experiences and behave in similar ways in similar situations, are similarly minded (like me). Still, this is an inferential argument and does not provide deductive certainty to make the problem of other minds go away.
Sources
https://philarchive.org/rec/GOMSAO-2
The Thinking Lane 